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Despite recognizing the exogenous, cost-push nature of recent inflationary pressures in
Latin America, plus the difficulties faced by monetary authorities in dealing, under such
circumstances, with internal and external disequilibria simultaneously, intellectual atten-
tion in policy circles remains focused on demand-side issues and policy instruments.
This paper develops an eclectic model that has the potential to nest demand-side elements,
but focuses on cost-push factors – distributional conflict and propagation mechanisms – as
typically addressed by the post-Keynesian–structuralist tradition. In addition to shedding
some light on the nature of inflationary pressures as experienced in Latin American coun-
tries during the recent commodity boom – in particular South American commodity export-
ing economies – the paper’s main goal is to portray the policy and instrumental trade-offs
faced by policy-makers themselves. By bringing unconventional policy devices into the
model (such as direct interventions in commodity markets), we hope to broaden the
scope of the conventional macroeconomic policy instruments.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The post-Keynesian–structuralist tradition has consistently warned policy-makers and
academic economists about the historical nature of their subject matter. From a post-
Keynesian–structuralist perspective, no single model is appropriate for all developing
* A preliminary version of this paper was presented at ‘Structuralism, development and
international institutions. A conference in honor of Lance Taylor,’ held at the New School for
Social Research, New York, 14 October 2011. We thank participants for their comments, in par-
ticular Laura Carvalho. The authors would also like to thank the two anonymous referees for
their valuable and useful comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.
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countries because their structures differ; not only at the economic, but also at the
political, sociological, and even at the cultural level.
When it comes to formalizing economic phenomena, the post-Keynesian–
structuralist approach puts emphasis on the need to construct models appropriate
to specific institutional and geographical constraints (Taylor 1983; 1988), including
social practices or ‘rules of the game’ and actual economic linkages as found in the
real world, particularly with regard to developing economies. Macroeconomics must
therefore start from the interpretation of the relevant structures and economic
linkages in each particular case, including the institutional setting of the problem
in question.
Post-Keynesian–structuralist macroeconomics is not only inductive (that is, histor-
ical, institutional), but also pragmatic in nature, in that it seeks to relate theoretical
problems to concrete policy concerns. With this pragmatic motivation in mind, this
paper intends to capture the difficulties many Latin American countries have faced in
recent years in coping with the inflationary pressures caused by rising and increasingly
volatile international commodity prices. We develop an eclectic model1 that has the poten-
tial to nest demand-side elements while focusing on cost-push factors – international
commodity prices, distributional conflict and propagation mechanisms – as addressed
by the post-Keynesian–structuralist tradition, with the aim of identifying the institutional
and/or policy factors (for example, monetary-cum-exchange-rate regimes) as well as
certain structural features (for example, the weight of food in consumption baskets,
whether a country is a net importer or exporter of food stables, etc.) that explain the
different speed and extent of pass-through effects in different cases.
There is a prominent post-Keynesian–structuralist theoretical and empirical litera-
ture on inflation, including on the Latin American case, which combines balance-of-
payments constraints with distributional conflicts and indexation schemes, and has
made up the foundations of much macroeconomic reasoning for generations of
Latin American macroeconomists (Sunkel 1958; Seers 1962; Olivera 1967; 1973;
Frenkel 1984; Vernengo 2003).
In this paper, in addition to shedding some light on the nature of inflationary pres-
sures as experienced in Latin American countries during the recent commodity boom,
in particular South American commodity-exporting economies, our chief goal is to
portray the policy and instrumental trade-offs faced by policy-makers themselves.
By bringing unconventional policy devices into the model itself (such as direct inter-
ventions in commodity markets) we hope to broaden the scope of the conventional
macroeconomic policy instruments – not only as regards the orthodox, but also the
structuralist toolkit.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 elaborates on the underlying motiv-
ation, Section 3 presents the baseline model and four (policy-related) different vari-
ations, and Section 4 concludes.
2 THE COMMODITY BOOM IN THE 2000s AND THE STANDARD
POLICY RESPONSE
After the dip inflicted by the Great Recession in 2009, most agricultural prices
resumed their 2003–2008 escalating path and – even after a slight reversal in 2013
1. For a concise distinction between mono- and multi-causal or ‘eclectic’ theories of inflation,
see Smithin (2011).
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and evidence that the commodity super-cycle may be coming to an end – have
remained at historically high levels. Food price volatility also increased during the
course of the boom years; in the second half of 2008, volatility attained its highest
levels since the beginning of the 1970s (ECLAC 2011a).
The discussion as to what has caused the recent upward trend and heightened
volatility in agricultural prices has to some extent been open hitherto. Some point
to structural factors (fundamentals) related to supply and demand of food, including
changing patterns of world demand; others to climate change and its ever more erra-
tic impact on supply; while others stress the mounting role of speculation with com-
modities, particularly the interpenetration of the agricultural, financial, and energy
markets.2
Despite discrepancies in opinion, everyone seems to agree that the combination
of rising prices and especially higher volatility is here to stay. This entails a serious
challenge for policy-makers, especially to those brought up in the orthodox tradi-
tion, who are not used to dealing with cost-push inflation in a systematic manner.
Standard advice points to accommodating first-round effects of food and other
similar price swings (for example, energy) on the consumer price index but not
second-round effects, which should be kept strictly under control. Take, for
instance, the following statements by the Bank of International Settlements, pub-
lished in June 2011:
Soaring commodity prices have… raised concerns about a significant increase in underlying
inflation via second-round effects. There are clear signs of mounting wage pressures in some
major emerging market economies… . Dwindling economic slack and persistent inflation in
these countries have been pushing up wage demands. (BIS 2011, p. 56)
Against this backdrop, central banks must remain highly alert to a buildup of inflationary
pressures. They should do so even if the evidence may seem at odds with conventional esti-
mates of domestic economic slack and domestic wage developments. Vigilance and a timely
tightening of monetary policy in both emerging market and advanced economies will be
needed to maintain well anchored inflation expectations, preserve a low-inflation environ-
ment globally and reinforce central banks’ inflation fighting credibility. (ibid., p. 60).
The following statement by the IMF, published in April 2011, points in a similar direction:
The challenge for many emerging and some developing economies is to ensure that present
boom-like conditions do not develop into overheating over the coming year. Inflation pressure
is likely to build further as growing production comes up against capacity constraints, with
large food and energy price increases, which weigh heavily in consumption baskets, motivat-
ing demands for higher wages. Real interest rates are still low and fiscal policies appreciably
more accommodative than before the crisis. Appropriate action differs across economies,
depending on their cyclical and external conditions. However, a tightening of macroeconomic
policies is needed in many emerging economies. (IMF 2011a, p. 5)
It follows that in the realm of conventional macroeconomic wisdom there seems to
exist no valid policy instrument to deal with cost-push inflationary pressures other
than those associated with the prevention of second-round effects. This means keeping
claims for nominal wage improvements in check – via a slowdown in overall econ-
omic activity – so that rising costs do not spread through non-tradables and end up
affecting underlying (or core) inflation. Of course, this may imply a need to allow
2. For a more detailed discussion see UNCTAD (2011).
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for pervasive real wage cutbacks and, to the extent that food consumption weighs more
heavily in the consumption baskets of the poor, the likely worsening of income
distribution.3
In line with this type of judgment, monetary authorities in many Latin American
countries have responded to the rise in international commodity prices by tightening
monetary policy, thus raising interest rates and causing a nominal appreciation of
their currencies. This was the case not only in the 2007–2008 surge but also, albeit
more moderately, during the most recent 2010–2011 rise (ECLAC 2011b).
Note, however, that in Latin America, due to relatively low financial intermediation
(with the probable exception of Chile), the credit channel is rather weak compared
with the exchange-rate channel. As a result, in Latin America aggregate demand has
always been rather insensitive to changes in interest rates.4 Hence, in practice mone-
tary policy in Latin America has operated chiefly via the exchange-rate channel, by
reducing the domestic value of tradable goods (a first-round effect), including food
staples, rather than by easing the pace of aggregate demand (a second-round effect).
This mechanism turned particularly important in the presence of rising international
commodity prices (Abeles and Borzel 2010).
Figure 1 shows the offsetting role played by nominal exchange-rate appreciation
vis-à-vis surging commodity prices as headline inflation went up in Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay.5 In particular, Brazil, Colombia, and Uruguay
have resorted to hard-line currency appreciation in order to keep inflationary pressures
in check.6
The tendency of exchange rates to appreciate not only resulted from rising domestic
interest rates but also from falling interest rates in advanced economies. In the early
stages of the commodity boom, the improvement in terms of trade also contributed
to the appreciation of nominal exchange rates, especially in South American primary
exporting economies. In fact, a striking feature of the commodity boom period is, after
an initial improvement, the sequence of rising terms of trade and deteriorating current-
account balances, particularly in 2010.7
From the point of view of price stabilization, it may make sense to concentrate
efforts on first-round effects associated with rising international commodity prices
in view of the fact that commodity prices – particularly food prices – tend to have
stronger and longer-lasting effects on inflation in economies with high food shares
3. In all fairness, the IMF, as well as other international organizations, do acknowledge the
impact of rising commodity prices on the poor (particularly staple food prices) and therefore
recommend the development of new targeted safety nets or the strengthening of existing ones.
4. See Barbosa (2008), Frenkel (2008), and Galindo and Ros (2008).
5. With the exception of Uruguay, all of these countries have formally adopted inflation-
targeting regimes.
6. This does not imply that monetary authorities in these countries have adopted free-floating
exchange-rate regimes. Indeed, intervention in currency markets abounds in the region, even in
these particular cases, mainly to moderate short-term volatility, but also to prevent ‘excessive’
currency appreciation, especially in times of abundant international liquidity.
7. These events point to the potential incongruities faced by economies with formal inflation
targets and foreign sector constraints. Perez Caldentey and Vernengo (2013) argue that the jus-
tification for inflation-targeting regimes is derived from a closed-economy setting which is not
representative of the countries that have actually adopted inflation-targeting frameworks, where
concerns over the evolution of the external sector and the exchange rate in practice frequently
override concerns over internal price stabilization.
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in the consumption basket, as is the case in most developing countries.8 But, as we
know from the development literature, resorting to exchange-rate appreciation as an
anti-inflationary device comes at the medium-term cost of Dutch disease-type symp-
toms and destabilizing foreign-debt dynamics.
In part as a reaction to this type of concern, especially in the presence of marked
exchange-rate misalignments in some prominent semi-industrialized economies, the
IMF has somewhat relaxed its otherwise inflexible, doctrinaire position against capital
controls, so that by raising interest rates monetary authorities do not exacerbate
exchange-rate appreciation. But despite recognizing the difficulties faced by monetary
authorities in many developing countries in dealing with internal and external disequi-
libria simultaneously, attention has not shifted to the eventual implementation of other
CPI (Left) Nominal XR (Right) Commodity prices (Right) CPI (Left) Nominal XR (Right) Commodity prices (Right)
CPI (Left) Nominal XR (Right) Commodity prices (Right)
CPI (Left) Nominal XR (Right) Commodity prices (Right)
CPI (Left) Nominal XR (Right) Commodity prices (Right)
CPI (Left) Nominal XR (Right) Commodity prices (Right)
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
–25
–20
–15
–10
–5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
M
ar
Ju
n
Se
p
D
-0
2
M
ar
Ju
n
Se
p
D
-0
3
M
ar
Ju
n
Se
p
D
-0
4
M
ar
Ju
n
Se
p
D
-0
5
M
ar
Ju
n
Se
p
D
-0
6
M
ar
Ju
n
Se
p
D
-0
7
M
ar
Ju
n
Se
p
D
-0
8
M
ar
Ju
n
Se
p
D
-0
9
M
ar
Ju
n
Se
p
D
-1
0
M
ar
Ju
n
In
de
x 
(D
ec
. 2
00
0 
= 
10
0)
In
de
x 
(D
ec
. 2
00
0 
= 
10
0)
In
de
x 
(D
ec
. 2
00
0 
= 
10
0)
In
de
x 
(D
ec
. 2
00
0 
= 
10
0)
Y
oY
 v
ar
ia
tio
n 
(in
 p
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
po
in
ts
)
Brasil
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
–25
–20
–15
–10
5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
M
ar
Ju
n
Se
p
D
-0
2
M
ar
Ju
n
Se
p
D
-0
3
M
ar
Ju
n
Se
p
D
-0
4
M
ar
Ju
n
Se
p
D
-0
5
M
ar
Ju
n
Se
p
D
-0
6
M
ar
Ju
n
Se
p
D
-0
7
M
ar
Ju
n
Se
p
D
-0
8
M
ar
Ju
n
Se
p
D
-0
9
M
ar
Ju
n
Se
p
D
-1
0
M
ar
Ju
n
Chile
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
–25
–20
–15
–10
–5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
M
ar
Ju
n
Se
p
D
-0
2
M
ar
Ju
n
Se
p
D
-0
3
M
ar
Ju
n
Se
p
D
-0
4
M
ar
Ju
n
Se
p
D
-0
5
M
ar
Ju
n
Se
p
D
-0
6
M
ar
Ju
n
Se
p
D
-0
7
M
ar
Ju
n
Se
p
D
-0
8
M
ar
Ju
n
Se
p
D
-0
9
M
ar
Ju
n
Se
p
D
-1
0
M
ar
Ju
n
Colombia
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
–25
–20
–15
–10
–5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
M
ar
Ju
n
Se
p
D
-0
2
M
ar
Ju
n
Se
p
D
-0
3
M
ar
Ju
n
Se
p
D
-0
4
M
ar
Ju
n
Se
p
D
-0
5
M
ar
Ju
n
Se
p
D
-0
6
M
ar
Ju
n
Se
p
D
-0
7
M
ar
Ju
n
Se
p
D
-0
8
M
ar
Ju
n
Se
p
D
-0
9
M
ar
Ju
n
Se
p
D
-1
0
M
ar
Ju
n
México
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
–25
–20
–15
–10
–5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
M
ar
Ju
n
Se
p
D
-0
2
M
ar
Ju
n
Se
p
D
-0
3
M
ar
Ju
n
Se
p
D
-0
4
M
ar
Ju
n
Se
p
D
-0
5
M
ar
Ju
n
Se
p
D
-0
6
M
ar
Ju
n
Se
p
D
-0
7
M
ar
Ju
n
Se
p
D
-0
8
M
ar
Ju
n
Se
p
D
-0
9
M
ar
Ju
n
Se
p
D
-1
0
M
ar
Ju
n
Perú
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
–25
–20
–15
–10
–5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
M
ar
Ju
n
Se
p
D
-0
2
M
ar
Ju
n
Se
p
D
-0
3
M
ar
Ju
n
Se
p
D
-0
4
M
ar
Ju
n
Se
p
D
-0
5
M
ar
Ju
n
Se
p
D
-0
6
M
ar
Ju
n
Se
p
D
-0
7
M
ar
Ju
n
Se
p
D
-0
8
M
ar
Ju
n
Se
p
D
-0
9
M
ar
Ju
n
Se
p
D
-1
0
M
ar
Ju
n
Uruguay
Y
oY
 v
ar
ia
tio
n 
(in
 p
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
po
in
ts
)
Y
oY
 v
ar
ia
tio
n 
(in
 p
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
po
in
ts
)
Y
oY
 v
ar
ia
tio
n 
(in
 p
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
po
in
ts
)
Y
oY
 v
ar
ia
tio
n 
(in
 p
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
po
in
ts
)
Y
oY
 v
ar
ia
tio
n 
(in
 p
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
po
in
ts
)
In
de
x 
(D
ec
. 2
00
0 
= 
10
0)
In
de
x 
(D
ec
. 2
00
0 
= 
10
0)
Figure 1 CPI, nominal exchange rates, and commodity prices, January 2002 to June
2011
8. According to a recent IMF survey, the median food share is 17 percent in advanced econo-
mies and 31 percent in emerging and developing economies (IMF 2011b).
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policies that may be of assistance in neutralizing or smoothing-out first-round effects –
other than allowing for the ‘side effect’ of exchange-rate appreciation – but has largely
remained focused on the search for alternative contractionary devices to deal with
second-round effects, typically fiscal (IMF 2011a).
According to standard advice, in order to prevent rising international commodity
prices from having an impact on core inflation, wage demands (which tend to push
non-tradable prices upwards) should be kept under control. To achieve this goal, over-
all economic activity needs to be cooled off. For that purpose, the customary policy
tool, contractionary monetary policy, has proven less and less appropriate, as it
tends to exacerbate the underlying tendency of exchange rates to appreciate, with
negative effects on non-traditional tradable sector profitability.
To be sure, a slower pace for aggregate demand makes fighting inflation much
easier. But if the main triggering factor does not lie in domestic demand but pertains
to rising international commodity prices, particularly food prices, tackling second-
round effects alone via conventional contractionary policies seems ineffective and,
most importantly, unnecessarily costly from a social point of view.9 Fighting inflation
via exchange-rate appreciation is likely to be more effective, but might be even worse
due to the above-mentioned medium-term costs. We elaborate on these trade-offs
using the model presented below.
3 THE MODEL
The model developed in this section is constructed on the simplifying assumption that
international commodity prices, aggregate demand, and GDP are exogenous variables,
as in part of the structuralist literature (for example, Olivera 1967; Canavese 1982).
The novelty in our model is that (i) we seek to include non-conventional macroeconomic
policy instruments (for example, flexible import tariffs or export duties for wage goods,
subsidies, and price regulation in public services, etc.) and (ii) we deal with five different
sectors, instead of the more familiar two-sector models of the structuralist tradition.
3.1 The baseline model
Domestic inflation πt is a weighted average of inflation in the tradable and non-
tradable goods (πtt and πntt , respectively), with three varieties in the case of tradable
goods and two in the case of non-tradable goods.
The three different tradable goods are: wage goods (w); other ‘non-edible’ primary
goods (op); and manufactures (m). We assume the country is a semi-industrialized
economy, with an emerging but underdeveloped manufacturing sector, but originally
specialized in the production of either w or op. We also assume that the country is a
price-taker in all markets and that international prices of w, op, and m grow at the exo-
genous rates ρ; φ; and ψ, respectively:
πwt ¼ ρ (1)
πopt ¼ χ (2)
πmt ¼ ψ; (3)
9. Arestis and Sawyer (2013) make a similar point.
522 Review of Keynesian Economics, Vol. 3 No. 4
© 2015 The Author Journal compilation © 2015 Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 09/04/2019 07:51:43PM
via free access
where πwt stands for the international inflation rate of wage goods (food staples), π
op
t
for the international inflation rate of other primary good (minerals and oil), and πmt for
the international inflation rate of manufactures.
The domestic prices of tradable goods evolve according to their international price,
the nominal exchange-rate variation ner (domestic currency per unit of foreign cur-
rency) and a policy variable we have dubbed the ‘decoupling coefficient’ (λi, for
i = w, op, and m), as in equations (4) to (6) below:
πwt ¼ πwt þ nert þ λw (4)
πopt ¼ πopt þ nert þ λop (5)
πmt ¼ πmt þ nert þ λm: (6)
The decoupling coefficients λw; λop and λm indicate the extent to which the variations
in import tariffs, export duties, domestic taxes, or subsidies, etc., affect the domestic
price variations of wage goods, other primary goods, and manufactures, respectively.
For example, in the case of an import tariff on wage goods, a reduction in λw reduces πwt
for a given change in international food prices πwt and a given change in the nominal
exchange rate nert.
Equation (7) summarizes the domestic inflation rate of tradable goods πtt:
πt t ¼ aπwt þ bπopt þ cπmt ðwith aþ bþ c ¼1Þ ( 7)
where a, b, and c are consistent with the weights of w, op, and m goods in this group.
Before moving on to non-tradables, let us define the wage function, which is most
important to the structuralist tradition and its approach to inflation. Equation (8) below
assumes that wages in all five sectors (the three tradable sectors described above plus
the two non-tradable sectors to be described shortly, a regulated rnt and an unregulated
unt non-tradable sector) grow at the same pace. This pace is determined by a leading
union. We assume this union belongs to either one of the two traditional exporting
sectors (w or op). Equation (8) also includes an ‘adaptive expectations’ or inertial coef-
ficient ε, linked to the inflation rate in t – 1, and a distributional coefficient κ; which
indicates the extent to which productivity growth in the leading union’s sector is
passed on to workers:
wwt ¼ wopt ¼ wmt ¼ wuntt ¼ wrntt ¼ wt ¼ επt−1 þ κϕl ; (8)
where ϕl stands for productivity growth in the leading sector.
Let us now turn to the non-tradable sector. As mentioned above, we split this sector
up into a regulated and an unregulated (or competitive) sub-sector. In the latter, prices
evolve according to a Kaleckian price equation where the sectoral inflation rate is a
function of average variable costs and unit profit margins. The evolution of average
variable costs in turn depends on the variation of unit labor costs ðwuntt −ϕunt Þ, the
tradable inputs’ inflation rate πt t, and the non-tradable inputs’ inflation rate πntt , in
proportion to their respective (d, e, f, and g) weights in the gross value of production.
Inflation in unregulated non-tradable sectors also depends on the variation of unit
profit margins τ, also in proportion to its weight in the gross value of production.
We assume unit profit margins remain unchanged throughout the cycle, but they
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could be positively related to output growth, which is also exogenously determined in
the present model.
πuntt ¼ d

wuntt −ϕ
unt
þ eðπt tÞ þ f ðπntt Þ þ gτ: (9)
Prices in the regulated non-tradable sector grow at an exogenous rate δ, which is a
policy variable.
πrntt ¼ δ (10)
Non-tradable inflation is a weighted average of regulated and unregulated non-
tradable inflations rates:
πnt t ¼ hπuntt þ ð1− hÞπrntt ðwith 0< h< 1Þ (11)
Headline inflation is the weighted average of domestic tradable and non-tradable inflation:
πt ¼ απtt þ ð1− αÞπntt : (12)
Equation (13) indicates the change in the markup rate over unit labor costs in the man-
ufacturing sector:
μmt ¼ πmt − jðwmt −ϕmÞ: (13)
This reveals the potential profitability of domestic production of non-traditional trad-
able goods. The change in the markup rate over unit labor costs in the manufacturing
sector μmt depends on the domestic inflation rate of manufactured goods πmt , as deter-
mined by equation (6), and on the increase of unit labor costs jðwmt −ϕmÞ, where ϕm
denotes labor productivity growth in the domestic manufacturing sector and j the
weight of labor costs in the gross value of manufacturing production.
Equations (14) and (15) represent the distributive conflict, setting the rules of the
game with regard to labor productivity growth and its impact on the profit share.
Equation (14) portrays average labor productivity ϕtot t as a weighted average of
labor productivity growth in the five sectors of the economy (with the corresponding
weights set in proportion to consumption weights):
ϕtot t ¼ αaϕw þ αbϕop þ αcϕm þ ð1− αÞhϕunt þ ð1− αÞð1− hÞϕrnt : (14)
Combining productivity growth, as represented in (14), with prices and wage determi-
nation, as represented in (12) and (8) respectively, equation (15) below arrives at an
expected result – namely that the change in the profit share btott is equal to the increase
in average labor productivity minus the increase in the real wage.
btott ¼ πt þ ϕtot t −wt (15)
Solving (1) through (15) for πt we obtain:
πt ¼ 11− f h
n
½heð1− αÞ þ αð1− f hÞ½aðρ þ λwÞ þ bðχ þ λopÞ þ cðψ þ λmÞ
þ ner þ hð1− αÞgτþ dκϕl − dϕuntþ ð1− αÞð1− hÞδo
þ 1
1− f h
½ð1− αÞhdεπt− 1: (16)
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And as t → ∞, from equation (16) we get:
πt ¼ 11− f h− ½ð1− αÞhdε
n
½heð1− αÞ þ αð1− f hÞ½aðρ þ λwÞ þ bðχ þ λopÞ þ cðψ þ λmÞ
þ ner þ hð1− αÞgτþ dκϕl − dϕunt þ ð1− αÞð1− hÞδo: (17)
If, in addition, we assume that the nominal exchange rate and the ‘decoupling coeffi-
cients’ remain unchanged (that is, nert ¼ λi ¼ 0;∀i ∈ ½w; op;m) and the stability con-
dition holds (f hþ ½ð1− αÞhdε< 1), equation (17) boils down to:
πBASEt ¼ 11− f h− ½ð1− αÞhdε
n
½heð1− αÞ þ αð1− f hÞ½aðρÞ þ bðχÞ þ cðψÞ
þ hð1− αÞgτþ dκϕl − dϕuntþ ð1− αÞð1− hÞδo: (18)
The inflation rate in the baseline model πBASEt, with no ‘policy action,’ will thus be
higher: (i) the higher the international inflation rate (½aðρÞ þ bðχÞ þ cðψÞ, including
their respective weights in the CPI), as in the Scandinavian structuralist tradition
(Maynard and van Ryckeghem 1976); (ii) the stronger the wage resistance, as indicated
by the adaptive expectations or inertial coefficient ε; (iii) the larger the share of produc-
tivity growth workers take hold of in the leading sector ðκϕlÞ, as this share has a bearing
on wage increases in the rest of the economy, particularly in the non-tradable sectors;
(iv) the larger the variation of the non-tradable sector’s unit profit margin τ; and
(v) the larger the growth rate of prices in the regulated non-tradable sector (δ).
In short, the baseline model states that domestic inflation is determined by interna-
tional inflation, sectoral productivity growth disparities, distributional conflict, and
regulated non-tradable sector prices (for example, utility rates). Note that both ε and
τ are typically procyclical in practice (that is, they increase with higher capacity util-
ization), although they are kept exogenous here to keep things simple.
Non-traditional tradable sector profitability is represented in this model by the evo-
lution of the markup rate over unit labor costs in the manufacturing sector, which in the
baseline equals:
μm;BASEt ¼ ψ − jε
 1
1− f h− ½ð1− αÞhdε
n
½heð1− αÞ þ αð1− f hÞ½aðρÞ þ bðχÞ þ cðψÞ
þ hð1− αÞgτþ dκϕl − dϕuntþ ð1− α Þð1− hÞδo− jðκϕl −ϕmÞ: (19)
Similarly, from (8), (14), (15), and (18) we obtain the variation in the profit share:
btot;BASEt ¼ ð1− εÞ
 1
1− f h− ½ð1− αÞhdε
n
½heð1− αÞ þ αð1− f hÞ½aðρÞ þ bðχÞ
þ cðψÞ þ hð1− αÞgτþ dκϕl − dϕuntþ ð1− αÞð1− hÞδoþ αaϕw
þ αbϕop þ αcϕm þ βhϕunt þ βiϕrnt − κϕl : (20)
Note in equation (19) that the change in the markup rate over unit labor costs in the
manufacturing sector depends, first, on the variation of international manufacturing
prices ψ, but also among other things on the difference between the leading and the
manufacturing sector’s productivity growth rates. In turn, in equation (20) the change
in the overall profit share depends, among other things, negatively on ε and κ, an indi-
cator of unions’ negotiating strength.
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In what follows we focus on the effects of different exchange-rate regimes and/or
direct intervention in commodity markets in the inflation rate, non-traditional trad-
able sector competitiveness, and income distribution. By dealing with these issues
at an analytical level we seek to shed some light on the recent trade-offs faced by
policy-makers themselves in the Latin American region, particularly in South
America.
We analyse four ‘ideal types.’ As suggested above, at one end of the spectrum
some countries have confronted the rise in international commodity prices essen-
tially via nominal exchange-rate appreciation, a side-effect of standard monetary
policy tightening. We deal with this type of situation under Case 1 below. At the
other end of the spectrum, other countries have deliberately sought to prevent
exchange-rate appreciation (resulting from improving terms of trade, rising domes-
tic prices, and high international liquidity), in order to protect non-traditional
tradable industries,10 and seem to have been less concerned about inflation. We
deal with this type of approach under Case 3 below. Somewhere in the middle,
other countries have introduced administrative measures instead of standard monetary
policy tightening. This is where ‘decoupling’ measures play a relevant role. We tackle
the effects of this line of attack under Case 2 below. Finally, in Case 4 we deal with
the combination of Cases 2 and 3.
3.2 Case 1: exchange-rate appreciation (inflation-targeting regimes)
In general, South American countries with formal inflation-targeting regimes have
resorted to exchange-rate appreciation as their main anti-inflationary device against
rising international commodity prices. In theory, as mentioned earlier, monetary author-
ities raise interest rates to cool off aggregate demand via the credit channel in order to
avert second-round effects that may result from the rise in commodity prices, particu-
larly food staples. But in practice inflation is held back not – or not mainly – due to the
contractionary effect of higher interest rates on aggregate demand but due to its cost-
reducing effect on tradable goods in general (recall Figure 1).
In order to represent this type of situation, we keep the baseline model’s assumption
that λi ¼ 0;∀i ∈ ½w; op;m but in order to illustrate the characteristic exchange-rate
appreciating reaction, the following exchange-rate rule is introduced:
nert ¼ −γρ ðwith 0≤ γÞ (21)
10. The literature favoring this type of policy stance (for example, Frenkel and Ros 2006)
maintains that a competitive exchange rate has an expansionary effect on aggregate demand
via the increase in profit margins. Accordingly this literature assumes that the positive impact
of a more competitive exchange rate on investment and exports outstrips its negative impact
on consumption, which results from the ensuing fall in real wages. Empirical evidence seems
inconclusive on this. While a recent post-Keynesian publication (Lavoie and Stockhammer
2014) presents data that appear to confirm this view for Latin American countries, there is
also empirical evidence with conflicting results (also involving Latin American countries), par-
ticularly with regard to the effect of exchange rates on export performance, suggesting a low or
insignificant impact of competitive exchange rates on exports (Bernat 2015). Despite this incon-
clusiveness, in constructing our formal model we take these contentions for granted in order to
show that even under these optimistic assumptions (regarding the impact of competitive
exchange rates on development) there exist superior exchange-rate-cum-monetary-policy strat-
egies (Panigo and Chena 2011).
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The rule depicted in equation (21) implies that the domestic impact of the increase in
international food prices is offset (partially or totally, depending on the magnitude
of γ) by the appreciation of the exchange rate. Assuming t → ∞ and the same
stability condition as above (that f hþ ½ð1− αÞhdε< 1), we now obtain:
πC1t ¼
1
1− f h− ½ð1− αÞhdε
n
½heð1− αÞ þ αð1− f hÞ½ða− γÞðρÞ þ bðχÞ þ cðψÞ
þ hð1− αÞgτþ dκϕl − dϕuntþ ð1− αÞð1− hÞδo: (22)
For a given rise in international inflation, the resulting inflation rate πC1t in (22) is smal-
ler than the baseline inflation rate πBASEt in (18); how much smaller depends, of course,
on the magnitude of γ.
The anti-inflationary achievement of this approach comes at a well-known cost: the
loss of competitiveness of non-traditional tradable industries, personified here by the
manufacturing sector. Under the exchange-rate rule given by equation (21) the manu-
facturing sector’s markup rate over unit labor costs evolves according to the following
expression:
μm;C1t ¼ ψ − γρ − jε
 1
1− f h− ½ð1− αÞhdε
n
½heð1− αÞ þ αð1− f hÞ½ða− γÞðρÞ þ bðχÞ
þ cðψÞ þ hð1− αÞgτþ dκϕl − dϕuntþ ð1− αÞð1− hÞδo− jðκϕl −ϕmÞ: (23)
It can be shown that μm;C1t is smaller than, or equal to, μ
m;BASE
t , but never larger.
11 The
negative effect of exchange-rate appreciation on profitability in the manufacturing
sector will be larger the smaller are j, ε, α, h, d, and e, and the larger is f, with
limðj→1;ε→1;α→1;h→1;ðdþeÞ→1ÞΩ≅ 1 and limðj→0;ε→0;α→0;h→0;f→1ÞΩ≅ 0. Indeed, when
these parameters tend to 0, Ω, as defined in footnote 11, also does, which means
that exchange-rate appreciation impact on manufacturing sector prices is not comple-
tely offset by the fall in unit labor costs.
As per the effect of exchange-rate appreciation on the profit share, assuming that in
the short term employment and productivity growth do not vary, we obtain:
btot;C1t ¼ ð1− εÞ
 1
1− f h− ½ð1− αÞhdε
n
½heð1− αÞ þ αð1− f hÞ½ða− γÞðρÞ þ bðχÞ
þ cðψÞ þ hð1− αÞgτþ dκϕl − dϕuntþ ð1− αÞð1− hÞδo
þ αaϕw þ αbϕop þ αcϕm þ βhϕunt þ βiϕrnt−κϕl : (24)
Here, again, it can be shown that btot;C1t ≤ b
tot;BASE
t means that in the short run currency
appreciation leads to a less regressive (or, yet, more progressive) income distribution.
But while this is true in the short run, according to the ‘new developmentalism’12 it
need not be true in the medium or long term, as employment generation decelerates
or recedes (along with current-account deterioration). In equation (24) this medium-
term scenario may be interpreted as a reduction of ε.
11. For this proof it should be borne in mind that 1≥Ω; where Ω ¼ ½heð1− αÞþαð1− f hÞ jεð1− f hÞ− ½ð1− αÞhdε
 
, that
all the parameters fall in the range (0,1), and that in equation (9) d + e + f + g = 1.
12. See discussion in footnote 10.
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3.3 Case 2: selective ‘decoupling’ (import tariffs, export duties, domestic taxes,
subsidies, etc.)
There are other policy devices that can help decouple domestic from international
commodity prices. Different countries have resorted to different administrative instru-
ments depending on their economic and institutional structure. In some cases, import
tariffs were reduced in order to reduce the domestic cost of a particular good (for
example, sugar in Peru); in others, variable internal taxes on certain essential goods
were established, so as to smoothen the domestic effect of volatility in international
markets (for example, gasoline in Chile); in others, export duties were increased in tan-
dem with the rise in international commodity prices (for example, agricultural exports
in Argentina), so as to reduce the net export price attained by producers and thus
diminish the domestic price. In yet other cases, where state-owned enterprises set
the market price, domestic prices were smoothened vis-à-vis international prices (for
example, oil in Brazil).
Formally, this implies the need to maintain the assumption that nert ¼ λm ¼ 0, but
introduce the following policy rules:
λw ¼ −γρ (25)
λop ¼ −ωχ: (26)
This means that import tariffs, export duties, specific domestic taxes, etc., which have
an effect on the domestic price of commodities, will vary when international commod-
ity prices vary. For example, an import tariff on a particular commodity may be
reduced as its international price rises so as to moderate its pass-through to domestic
prices, and vice versa. Similarly, an export duty on a particular good may be increased
as its international price rises, and vice versa. With this amendment, the reduced form
is now:
πC2t ¼
1
1− f h− ½ð1− αÞhdε
n
½heð1− αÞ þ αð1− f hÞ½að1− γÞðρÞ þ bð1−ωÞðχÞ
þ cðψÞ þ hð1− αÞgτþ dκϕl − dϕuntþ ð1− αÞð1− hÞδo: (27)
Here, πC2t is also smaller than πBASEt but indeterminate vis-à-vis πC1t . If ω ¼ 0, so that
decoupling operates only on international food prices (and not in other tradable
goods), then πC2t > πC1t , since að1− γÞðρÞ> ða− γÞðρÞ. More generally, the comparison
between πC2t and πC1t depends on the following inequality: ρ ⋚ω
χ
γð1−aÞ. The difference
between πC2t and πC1t will be larger, the higher is international food inflation (ρ) vis-à-vis
other primary products (χ) and the larger the food decoupling coefficient (γ) vis-à-vis
the other primary goods’ decoupling coefficient (ωÞ. In both cases, πC2t and πC1t , the out-
come is smaller than πBASEt .
However, as opposed to the previous case, with selective decoupling the manufac-
turing sector’s markup rate over unit labor costs does not decline so much:
μm;C2t ¼ ψ − jε
 1
1− f h− ½ð1− αÞhdε
n
½heð1− αÞ þ αð1− f hÞ½að1− γÞðρÞ þ bð1−ωÞðχÞ
þ cðψÞ þ hð1− αÞgτþ dκϕl − dϕunt þ ð1− αÞð1− hÞδo− jðκϕl −ϕmÞ: (28)
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Compared to equation (19), μm;C2t > μ
m;BASE
t , since

1
1− f h− ½ð1− αÞhdε ½heð1− αÞþf
αð1− f hÞ½að1− γÞðρÞ þ bð1−ωÞðχÞ þ cðψÞ þ ½hð1− αÞðgτþ dκϕl − dϕunt Þ þ ð1− αÞð1− hÞδgÞ<
1
1− f h− ½ð1− αÞhdε ½heð1− αÞ þ αð1− f hÞ½aðρÞ þ bðχÞ þ cðψÞ þ

hð1− αÞgτþ dκϕl − dϕuntn
þð1− αÞð1− hÞδg. As we know μm;BASEt > μm;C1t , then μm;C2t > tm;C1μ also.
With regard to income distribution, the comparison betweenCases 1 and 2 is again inde-
terminate a priori. The change in the profit share btott in the case of selective decoupling is:
btot;C2t ¼ ð1− εÞ
 1
1− f h− ½ð1− αÞhdε
n
½heð1− αÞ þ αð1− f hÞ½að1− γÞðρÞ þ bð1−ωÞðχÞ
þ cðψÞ þ hð1− αÞgτþ dκϕl − dϕuntþ ð1− αÞð1− hÞδoþ αaϕw þ αbϕop
þ αcϕm þ βhϕunt þ βiϕrnt − κϕl : (29)
It can be shown that btot;C2t ≤ b
tot;BASE
t , but its magnitude is indefinite with respect
to btot;C1t . In broad terms, b
tot;C2
t ≤ b
tot;C1
t if ρ ≤ω
χ
γð1− aÞ; an unlikely observation in
the region.
3.4 Case 3: real exchange-rate targeting
This case could be dubbed the ‘new developmentalism’ case, as it seeks to preserve exter-
nal price competitiveness in the non-traditional tradable sector. Formally this can be
represented in our framework by going back to the assumptions and equations used in
Case 1 (exchange-rate appreciation) but modifying equation (21) by the following rule:
nert ¼ −ψ þ jðwmt −ϕmÞ: (30)
This amounts to setting a nominal exchange rate (crawling peg) that ensures no loss of
competitiveness to the non-traditional manufacturing sector.13 Given ψ and ϕm, the
nominal exchange rate will thus rise as wmt rises, pushed by productivity in the leading
(exporting) sector. In this case, the model’s reduced form looks like this:
πC3t ¼
1
1− f h
n
½heð1− αÞ þ αð1− f hÞ½aρ þ bχ þ cψ þ ½hð1− αÞgτþ dκϕl − dϕunt 
þð1− αÞð1− hÞδoþ 1
1− f h
½ð1− αÞhdεπt− 1 þ 1ð1− f hÞ
n
j½heð1− αÞ
þ αð1− f hÞ ðκϕl −ϕmÞ− ψ
j
 	o
þ 1ð1− f hÞ
n
½heð1− αÞ þ αð1− f hÞ jεπt− 1
o
: (31)
As t → ∞ and the new stability condition holds (1> f hþ ½ð1− αÞhdε þ jε½heð1− αÞþ
αð1− f hÞ), equation (31) converges to:
πC3t ¼
1
1− f h− ½ð1− αÞhdε− jε½heð1− αÞ þ αð1− f hÞ
n
½heð1− αÞ
þαð1− f hÞ½aρ þ bχ þ cψ þ hð1− αÞgτþ dκϕl − dϕunt 
þð1− αÞð1− hÞδþ  j½heð1− αÞ þ αð1− f hÞhκϕl −ϕm− ψ
j
io
: (32)
13. It implies the additional assumption that non-labor costs do not vary significantly.
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Comparing equation (32) with (18), it follows that when ψ is not too high (a reasonable
assumption), so that the term j½heð1− αÞ þ αð1− f hÞ ðκϕl −ϕmÞ− ψj
h i 
is positive
(or negative but small), then πC3t > ðπBASEt > πC2t ≥ πC1t Þ. This is due to the fact that
the ‘conflicting claims multiplier’ (in this case 11− f h− ½ð1− αÞhdε− jε½heð1− αÞþαð1− f hÞ) is lar-
ger than in the baseline case 11− f h− ½ð1− αÞhdε
 
.
As expected, real exchange-rate targeting leads to a higher inflation rate, but avoids
(by construction) exchange-rate appreciation, thus favoring the manufacturing sector
profitability (and allegedly avoiding or minimizing trade deficits). Indeed, since
nert ¼ −ψ þ jðwmt −ϕmÞ, it follows from equations (3), (6), and (13) that:
μm;C3t  0: (33)
Whatever the inflation rate, in this case we obtain that μm;C3t > μ
m;C2
t > μ
m;BASE
t > μ
m;C1
t .
Finally, regarding the change in the profit share, we have:
btot;C3t ¼ ð1− εÞ
 1
1− f h− ½ð1− αÞhdε− jε½heð1− αÞ þ αð1− f hÞ
n
½heð1− αÞ
þαð1− f hÞ½aρ þ bχ þ cψ þ hð1− αÞgτþ dκϕl − dϕunt
þð1− αÞð1− hÞδþ ð j½heð1− αÞ þ αð1− f hÞhðκϕl −ϕmÞ− ψ
j
io
þαaϕw þ αbϕop þ αcϕm þ βhϕunt þ βiϕrnt − κϕl : (34)
Since πC3t > ðπBASEt > πC2t ≥ πC1t Þ; real exchange-rate targeting generates the worst
functional distribution of income in the short run. Yet again, in the middle to long
term, as this strategy seeks to preserve manufacturing’s competitiveness, it need not
give way to the same regressive outcome.
3.5 Case 4: real exchange-rate targeting-cum-selective decoupling
The combination of real exchange-rate targeting with selective decoupling also illus-
trates some real-world situations. In practice, most countries have intervened strongly
in the currency markets at some point in order to moderate exchange-rate appreciation.
Also, many have introduced some type of market intervention in commodity markets
in order to make the domestic impact of the rise in international prices smaller.
Formally, the exchange-rate rule established in equation (30) in Case 3 (real
exchange-rate targeting) needs to be combined with the commodity price formation
rules established in equations (25) and (26) in Case 2 (selective decoupling) to obtain
the following reduced form for the inflation rate:
πC4t ¼
1
1− f h
n
½heð1−αÞ þ αð1− f hÞ½að1− γÞρ þ bð1− ωÞχ þ cψ
þ½hð1− αÞgτþ dκϕl − dϕuntþ ð1− αÞð1− hÞδo
þ 1
1− f h
½ð1− αÞhdεπt− 1 þ 1ð1− f hÞ
n
j½heð1− αÞ þ αð1− f hÞ
h
κϕl −ϕm

−
ψ
j
io
þ 1ð1− f hÞ
n
½heð1− αÞ þ αð1− f hÞ jεπt− 1
o
: (35)
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Once more, when t → ∞ and the stability condition holds (1> f hþ
½ð1− αÞhdε þ jε½heð1− αÞ þ αð1− f hÞ), we get:
πC4t ¼
1
1− f h− ½ð1− αÞhdε− jε½heð1− αÞ þ αð1− f hÞ
n
½heð1− αÞ þ αð1− f hÞ
½að1− γÞρ þ bð1−ϖÞχ þ cψþhð1− αÞgτþ dκϕl − dϕuntþ ð1− αÞ
ð1− hÞδþ j½heð1− αÞ þ αð1− f hÞhðκϕl −ϕmÞ− ψ
j
io
: (36)
It can be shown that πC2t < πC4t < πC3t . That is to say, the combination of real exchange-
rate targeting with selective decoupling preserves the non-traditional tradable sector’s
competitiveness, but at a lower inflationary cost in relation to the case of pure real
exchange-rate targeting (Case 3). This ‘policy mix’ bears a larger inflationary effect
than the case of pure selective decoupling (Case 2), but selective decoupling does
not preserve the non-traditional tradable sector’s competitiveness.
The comparison remains indeterminate with respect to πC1t and πBASEt , as in the case
of πC2t . One would expect that:
πC1t < π
C2
t < π
BASE
t < π
C4
t < π
C3
t : (37)
But, when inflation is to a large extent driven by international prices and these tend to
weigh heavily on CPIs, inequality (37) may well be different, depending on the cali-
bration of the selective decoupling coefficients (γ and ω). If these coefficients are suf-
ficiently large, so as to minimize the domestic impact of the rise in international
primary goods prices (ρ and χ), then πC4t may well show up to the left of πBASEt :
πC2t < π
C1
t < π
C4
t < π
BASE
t < π
C3
t : (38)
It is also feasible – though unlikely – that πC4t < πC1t . Still, even if that were not the case,
the combination of real exchange-rate targeting with selective decoupling is the only
option that can preserve non-traditional tradable competitiveness while simultaneously
exerting some control over the domestic impact of international inflation, since as in
Case 3:
μm;C4t  0: (39)
As regards the change in the profit share, we have that:
btot;C4t ¼ ð1− εÞ
 1
1− f h− ½ð1− αÞhdε− jε½heð1− αÞ þ αð1− f hÞ
n
½heð1− αÞ þ αð1− f hÞ
½að1− γÞρ þ bð1−ϖÞχ þ cψ þ hð1− αÞgτþ dκϕl − dϕuntþ ð1− αÞ
ð1− hÞδþ j½heð1− αÞ þ αð1− f hÞhðκϕl −ϕmÞ− ψ
j
io
þ αaϕw
þ αbϕop þ αcϕm þ βhϕunt þ βiϕrnt − κϕl : (40)
Here the comparison runs parallel to that of inflation rates among the different cases.
Higher inflation comes together with a larger profit share, so long as ε< 1, so that
btot;C2t < b
tot;C4
t < b
tot;C3
t . This is, by construction, a short-term result. However, in the
medium to long term, the profit share is likely to increase more in cases where the
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non-traditional tradable sector’s profitability is under pressure, namely Cases 1 and 2,
due to the medium-term effect of appreciated currencies on the likelihood of balance-
of-payments crises.
3.6 Comparative overview
Table 1 summarizes results for the most relevant policy dimensions discussed in the
paper, namely inflation, non-traditional (manufacturing) sector competitiveness, and
functional distribution of income. There is no dominant strategy. Clearly, when con-
fronted with rising international commodity prices, currency appreciation is the most
effective antidote against inflation, with selective decoupling a second-best. Selective
decoupling comes at the cost of higher inflation vis-à-vis currency appreciation, but is
less harmful to the non-traditional sector’s competitiveness. While in the short term
the currency appreciation option generates a more progressive distribution of income
than in the case of selective decoupling, in the medium to long term currency apprecia-
tion may result in a more regressive distributional impact due to insufficient capacity
growth in the tradable sector. We infer this from actual experience as the model only
deals with the short term. Real exchange-rate targeting has no negative effect on the
non-traditional sector’s competitiveness, but in the context of rising commodity prices
comes at the cost of much higher inflation. Combining real exchange-rate targeting
with selective decoupling preserves the aim of not hurting the non-traditional sector’s
competitiveness, but at a lower inflationary (and hence distributional) cost.
4 CONCLUSIONS
As in other developing regions, there has been a growing concern on the domestic
inflationary impact of rising international commodity prices in Latin America (see,
Table 1 Different effects of the rise in international commodity prices on domestic
inflation, external competitiveness, and income distribution, depending on the policy
choice
Scenarios Inflation rate (πt) Reduction in manufacturing
sector markup
coefficient (μmt )
Increase in profit
share (btot;C4t )
Baseline Moderate Intermediate High
Case 1: XR appreciation Low High Low(ST), high (MT)
Case 2: Selective
decoupling
Intermediate lowa Low Intermediate (ST),
low (MT)
Case 3: Real XR
targeting
High Nil High (ST),
intermediate (MT)
Case 4: Real XR
targeting-cum-selective
decoupling
Intermediate highb Nil Intermediate (ST),
low (MT)
Notes:
a. ‘Intermediate low’ here means lower than the baseline model but higher than in Case 1.
b. ‘Intermediate high’ here means higher than Cases 1 and 2 (plus may be the baseline model) but lower than
Case 3.
ST = short term; MT = medium term.
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for example, Lora et al. 2011). In South America, where primary exports predominate,
this inflationary drive coincided with the improvement in terms of trade. Resulting real
exchange-rate appreciation throughout the region should not have come as a surprise – it
is the expected effect of rising policy interest rates, as recommended by standard advice
in the presence of rising inflation, and ‘improved fundamentals.’14 Naturally, low inter-
est rates in advanced economies contributed to fuel this process from the ‘supply side’
(of international liquidity). What comes somewhat as a surprise is the coincidence of
soaring terms of trade and worsening current-account balances.
This occurrence – a deteriorating foreign front – has shifted attention towards
exchange-rate misalignment, both on ‘orthodox’ and ‘new developmentalist’ ranks.
In both cases, albeit from different perspectives and with different emphases, contrac-
tionary fiscal policy seems to have been brought back to the fore – in the ‘orthodox’
case, as a second-best to monetary policy as an aggregate demand management tool
(when further monetary tightening is likely to exacerbate exchange-rate misalign-
ment); in the ‘new developmentalist’ case, as a necessary offsetting force to the expan-
sionary side-effect built into exchange-rate market interventions aimed at thwarting
currency appreciation.
The common concern about currency appreciation is warranted – and, given the
region’s history, welcome. So too as regards the apprehension about the inflationary
effect of foreign-exchange market interventions, particularly in the context of rising
commodity prices. The attention paid to aggregate demand growth as a relevant vari-
able in dealing with inflation also seems sensible. But focusing exclusively on aggre-
gate demand management in the fight against inflation does not seem all that
reasonable, given the perceptible cost-push nature of the ‘first-round’ effects asso-
ciated with the international commodity boom.
A new open economy ‘impossibility trinity’ or ‘trilemma’ seems to follow from our
formal analysis, whereby only two of the following three objectives sought out –
domestic price stability, exchange-rate competitiveness, and income equality – could
be attained. Indeed, in a world of rising international commodity prices, price stability
and exchange-rate competitiveness can be attained simultaneously, but at the cost of
worsening income distribution. This is a case where nominal wages are kept in
check despite the growth in food prices. As a result, non-traditional tradable sector
competitiveness is achieved via real wage contraction – and, as food weighs more
heavily in the lower part of the wage pyramid, worsening of personal income distribu-
tion. This is the ‘new developmentalist’ case, which seeks to attain a trade surplus at
the expense of domestic absorption. Price stability and income equality can also be
attained simultaneously, yet again at the cost of exchange-rate competitiveness. This
is the standard approach as supported by most international financial institutions.
Finally, exchange-rate competitiveness and some equality in income distribution can
be attained simultaneously, but at the cost of higher inflation. In this case policy-
makers seek to manage the exchange rate as an industrial policy tool, but not at the
cost of a regressive distribution on income.
This trilemma cannot be fully overcome. But its implications can be amended. We
argue that the concern with regard to the rise in inflation and the simultaneous emer-
gence of apparent symptoms of ‘Dutch disease’ due to currency overappreciation
14. The following statement by the IMF (2011a) illustrates the point: ‘Exchange rates should
be allowed to continue to act as shock absorbers in the face of pressure stemming from economic
conditions in the region that have improved more than those in more advanced economies, pri-
marily because of terms-of-trade gains from high commodity export prices.’.
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cannot be tackled adequately if more audacious proposals concerning concrete market
interventions are not brought to the fore. The purpose of this paper is precisely to show
how these unconventional policy instruments, personified here via ‘decoupling coeffi-
cients,’ as applied in actual practice,15 can contribute to overcome the constraints
posed by the impossibility trilemma as portrayed above.
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